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In a recent discussion of modernism, Peter Osborne argues that the terms 
“modern,” “modernity,” and “modernization” need to be understood through their shared 
philosophical status as temporal constructions. The emergence of the modern within 
Western philosophy is predicated on a subjective notion of successive ruptures that 
distinguish the new from the old. Replacing an older understanding of cyclical 
temporality, since the fifth century the modern (modernus) (389) thus utilizes a linear, 
Christian version of eschatological historical time while exerting what Osborne refers to 
as a “performative logic of temporal negation” (392). In the nineteenth century, this 
temporal experience of modernity was formulated in Germany as Neuzeit (modernity; 
literally, “new time”): a new epochal concept unique in its linguistic reference to the 
contemporaneity of present time (Zeit), as opposed to the preceding periodizations of 
Miettelalter, mittlere Zeiten or Altertum.1 
In the later years of the nineteenth century and into the early decades of the 
twentieth century, this negating “absolutization of the present” (Osborne 390) as the 
time constitutive of producing the new came to dominate the utopian progressivism first 
of German Social Democracy and subsequently of the Communist Second 




evolutionism to their theories of the proletarian revolution, harnessing the telos of 
progress as an uninterrupted Heilsgeschichte, or dominant history that fused the 
progress of industrial and technological modernisation with the social and political 
progress of history itself (Jennings 50). This is exemplified in Georgi Plekhanov’s 
promise that the proletariat is “seated in that historical train which at full speed takes us 
to our goal” (qtd. in Leslie 174). Walter Benjamin famously shared his complete 
rejection of such vulgar Marxist appeals to teleological formulations of additive, linear 
historical time with Trotsky. Both Benjamin and Trotsky identified a similarity with the 
fascist Popular Front ideology of the conception of history as a triumphal dogma of 
progress that had become an empty continuum of repeated patterns of Immergleiche, 
the always-the-same historical narratives that represented themselves within a 
hermetic, totalized universe of progressive sequences, like a Fordist assembly line. 
Benjamin’s critique of this uncritical celebration of the German working classes qua 
agents of revolutionary change in the posthumously published 
Geschichtsphilosophische Thesen (“Theses on the Philosophy of History”), was also 
echoed by Max Horkheimer who later observed—with direct reference to Plekhanov’s 
metaphor of the historical train—that the goal of the German working class must no 
longer be “the acceleration of progress, but rather the jumping out of progress” (qtd. in 
Buck-Morss 168).  
 
Arresting the “realm of devouring Chronos”  
 
At first glance, perhaps, the conceptualization of historical time in German 
Marxist theory of the early decades of the twentieth century might seem tangential to a 
discussion of contemporary British fiction. However, there is an increasing concern in 
British novels of the twenty-first century with foregrounding temporal experience through 
disruptive, nonlinear and non-contemporaneous narrative frameworks.  Influenced by an 
earlier generation of experimental British writers concerned with the powerful critique 
available to speculative fictions—notably Doris Lessing, J. G. Ballard, and Muriel 
Spark—a generation of younger and/or pre-canonical novelists are offering new ways of 
imagining subjectivity and challenging traditional realism by explicitly experimenting with 
narrative times. Writers like David Mitchell, Jon McGregor, Maggie Gee, Hari Kunzru, 
John Burnside, Caryl Phillips, and Marina Warner produce innovative engagements with 
time through their narratives of futurity, apocalypse, transmigration, and haunting. A 
shared preoccupation with rupturing conceptions of linear historical progress brings 
these novelists together, and their dynamic body of fictions demonstrates the ways in 
which literary texts can contribute to critical and philosophical theories of historical time.  
Arguably the most inventive and exciting writer to engage with temporality in the 
twenty-first century is Sam Taylor. His debut novel, The Republic of Trees (2005), offers 
an astonishing, dystopian vision of adolescent revolutionary idealism that responds to 
three influential predecessors (which are all also first novels): William Golding’s Lord of 
the Flies (1954), Ian McEwan’s The Cement Garden (1978), and Iain M. Banks’s The 
Wasp Factory (1984).2 The novel spans the course of one summer, during which a 
group of expatriate British teenagers retreat into a forest in the foothills of the French 
Pyrenees to establish their own utopian republic, founded on the principles of 
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Rousseau’s Social Contract. Recounted through the unreliable narration of Michael, 
whose drinking and accident-prone tree-climbing inaugurate amnesiac bouts of 
temporal disorientation, Taylor’s increasingly sinister narrative progresses toward the 
inevitably authoritarian consequences of its revolutionary experiment. Michael and his 
comrades—Isobel, Louis, and Joy—establish a new time for their anticapitalist republic 
that attempts to overturn history, chronology and memory: “Gravity and memory. They 
felt like the same force. Pulling you down, sucking you back. I thought about what Louis 
had said—a revolution. King Gravity and Queen Memory. If we could execute those 
two—and Prince Time, too, perhaps—oh, what a world this could be! The blade, 
suspended above me, might never fall. The sky might stay blue for ever” (92-3). 
Michael’s imagined—and desired—suspension of what he elsewhere refers to as “the 
universal tyranny of time” (5) responds to a revolutionary tradition of arresting historical 
time and inaugurating qualitatively alternative temporal structures. Those millenarian 
expectations typically contained within the revolutionary rupture are nowhere more 
evident than in the attempt to decimalize time into ten-hour days and ten-day weeks 
during the French Revolution, whose new calendar was inaugurated post festum on 24 
November 1793.  
By choosing the French Revolution as the (increasingly) repressed context for his 
characters’ actions, Taylor structurally invokes a series of historical actions and their 
ideological mediations that have become focalized around several core questions of 
temporality: the will to power that becomes articulated by a revolutionary class through 
a perceived rupture in the lived time of the ancien régime; the desire to arrest, or jump 
outside of, historical progress; and the utopian ambition to inaugurate a calendric 
system capable of expressing the new revolutionary time. Michael’s desire to execute 
“Prince Time” and arrest a whole set of associated temporal sequences—including, 
presumably, his own adult development and the inevitable return to normality that the 
Naval Officer in Golding’s Lord of the Flies most notably heralded—articulates a 
blistering vision of static perfection freed from what the German utopian philosopher 
Ernst Bloch called the “realm of devouring Chronos” (Principle 1181). The impossible 
attempt to suspend into permanence the utopian blue of his forest-bound revolutionary 
horizon positions Michael within a tradition of revolutionaries aiming to arrest historical 
time; as Benjamin notes, during the 1830 July Revolution revolutionaries fired on the 
clock towers of Paris in an effort to explode the continuum of history (“The Storyteller” 
262).  
As the forest republic descends into an increasingly brutal, authoritarian regime 
Michael suffers a severe concussion from a fall, which further complicates his sense of 
temporal reality. Slipping in and out of consciousness, Michael becomes less able to 
distinguish between his waking and his dreaming selves, and the loss of temporal grasp 
he experiences each time he regains consciousness gives rise to the feeling that he is 
slipping in and out of time: 
 
“You were out cold. Oh, I’m so relieved” . . . 
“Out of time,” I muttered.  
Joy shook her head, and dust flew from her hair into the sunbeam. 
The motes became frantic. “No. not at all,” she said. “You’re not out of 




ahead. Do you understand?” 
“No,” I said, and she laughed.  
“Take your time, Citizen Michael. There’s no rush. Take all the time you 
want.” 
But there was no time, I knew that. No time like the present. Was 
this the present? Or was this some other, more obscure tense? The 
perfect conditional. The unreal past. (217) 
 
Lapsing “out[side] of time” becomes, for Michael, indistinguishable from being stuck “in 
time.” Both operate within a differentialized structure of the present that contains strands 
of the future (“the perfect conditional”) as well as the (“unreal”) past. This mode of 
temporality can usefully be considered through Bloch’s theorization of Ungleichzeitigkeit 
(non-contemporaneity or non-simultaneity). In his analysis of fascism in Heritage of Our 
Times, Bloch argued that the German population did not all live within the “same Now” 
and that many classes—particularly youth, agrarian peasantry, and the impoverished 
urban middle classes—built their cultural life around shared behaviors, hopes, and 
ideological beliefs that were non-contemporaneous with industrial capitalism. Indeed, 
these groups were often antimodern, antiurban, and sometimes even feudal in their fear 
of proletarianization. Taken at a more abstract level, Bloch’s model of non-
contemporaneity furnishes us with a temporal structure of the present (as experienced 
both subjectively and collectively) that is resonant with multiple alternative currents of 
pasts still alive and futures already emergent, whose ceaseless, processual oscillations 
fundamentally resist any linear chronologization.  
 
 
Metachronous Times  
 
Interestingly, Michael’s temporal dialectic (outside of time/stuck in time) is not 
unique to The Republic of Trees. It is my argument that what distinguishes a caucus of 
early twenty-first-century British fictions is their foregrounding of temporal experience. 
Such fictions demonstrate what I call, drawing on Bloch’s notion of non-
contemporaneity, metachronous times: that is, times in which multiple simultaneous 
pasts and futures are operative within the present. Bloch’s unsystematic theorization of 
anticipation is crucial to grasping the latent utopian potential that metachronous times 
cast. In a similar manner to Dasein which, as Heidegger states, is “authentically futural” 
– “futural” denoting a process of being that is always-already suffused with potentiality, 
rather than referring to a time which is oriented towards a future that is not yet actual 
(311) – Bloch understands the temporality of being-in-the-world as encompassing a fluid 
encounter with past experiences as well as projections of imagined futures so that being 
itself becomes dimly perceptible as an ever-fluctuating process rather than an 
ontological category.3 My contribution to Bloch’s philosophy of the “not yet” in using the 
term metachronous lies not only in its application to a range of twenty-first-century 
fictions but also in its reference to those narrative times that raise the paradox of 
subjective positions that sit outside of temporal representation. These metachronous 
times thus reveal a differentialized, simultaneous expression of residual pasts as well as 
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“futural” anticipations (in the Heideggerian sense) within an immanently understood 
present, and yet can—in some cases—also refer to vaguely posited times that are 
paradoxically external to time. 
Consider, for instance, John Burnside’s 2008 novel Glister. Narrated from an 
“everlasting present” (59), Burnside’s narrative presents us with an example of 
metachronous times: metachronous not only in the sense of occupying multiple 
simultaneous times, but also in the sense of the problematic positioning outside of, or 
above, the time of human history. The novel’s self-professed unreliable teenage 
narrator, Leonard, claims that his story is being related from some sort of afterlife: 
 
nothing slips away, not even the self. Nothing vanishes into the past; it 
gets forgotten and so becomes the future. It continues into a place that 
some people in the Innertown would call the afterlife—even though they 
know, in their hearts, that there is no afterlife, because there is no after. 
It’s always now, and everything—past and future, problem and resolution, 
life and death—everything is simultaneous here, at this point, in this 
moment (2). 
 
This simultaneity of all past and future temporalities within a non-contemporaneous and 
contradictory present transcends the frontier between the times of living and the times 
of death. From his narrative position of otherness—the apparent continuation of his 
existence beyond death—Leonard achieves the perspectival clarity with which to 
understand this processual, multilayered nature of the present and to realize that 
“everything is transformed, everything becomes, and that becoming is the only story 
that continues forever” (2). Burnside resists defining the time after death from which 
Leonard retrospectively narrates his story, merely calling it “the point where every story 
begins and ends” (2), the place in which the storyteller—as Benjamin writes—gains his 
authority. 
Similarly, Jeanette Winterson inscribes a temporal dialectic comparable to 
Michael’s experience of lapsing “out[side] of time” and being stuck “in time.” In her 2000 
novel, The PowerBook, Winterson continues her Woolfian fascination with subjective 
“liquid time” (243), offering us a differentialized understanding of temporality as multiply 
diffuse, always provisional, and open to an infinitely polysemous series of revisitings, 
erasures, and reworkings. The chameleon-like narrator Ali(x) (by turns, male, female, 
and cross-dressing), refers to a narrative location in which time is successfully halted: 
“[the] place where time stops. Where death stops. Where love is. Beyond time, beyond 
death” (109-10). However, this arrest of time also suggests a temporal location that is 
somehow outside of time, metachronously reflecting on totalized historical processes. 
The leitmotif of being outside time recurs throughout The PowerBook: Ali(x)’s infancy is 
recalled as “a brief eternity waiting for time to begin” (157), while she refers to the 
religiosity of her nuclear family as existing “like angels on the edge of time, glowing and 
intense” (195). Meanwhile, in her narrative of George Mallory’s final moments on the 
summit of Mount Everest, Ali(x) pronounces Mallory as “outside time,” describing how 
he laughs when his watch stops because “it was so silly really, his watch going tick, tick, 
tick, when time had stopped long since and there was no time” (151-2). The temporal 




time” (206)—is contrasted with moments when Ali(x) refers to herself and her lover as 
immanently “caught in time” (209). As quarries of time, “caught in time, running as fast 
as we can,” Ali(x) and her lover offer an ontological alternative at this point to the “time 
without end” (103) previously assembled through Ali(x)’s childhood memories, or her 
fictionalization of George Mallory’s final earthly moments. Winterson’s dialectical shifting 
between contradictory modes of temporal experience—between immanence (“caught in 
time”) and transcendence (“outside time”)—contributes to a carefully woven desuturing 
of any definitively or finally resting temporal location. 
The challenge to linear temporality offered by Taylor, Burnside and Winterson 
reveals the problematic “meta-” aspect of metachronous times in positing narrative 
temporalities that are paradoxically external to historical time. Such aesthetic 
experiments with narrative time raise the specter of temporal exteriority. For Osborne in 
The Politics of Time, the ontological status of the “timeless end” is surely problematized 
as a mode of historical totalization through its strongly theological connotations: “What 
is the ontological status of an end posited in exteriority and thereby paradoxically 
present, phenomenologically, within the very thing to which it is by definition exterior 
(time)? In particular, to what extent can it be understood independently of the 
theological connotations with which it is invariably associated in the context of the 
Judaic-Christian tradition?” (113). The paradox of representing a time both within and 
outside of time thus signals an increasingly postsecularist shift in twenty-first-century 
narratives. The engagement of British writers like Taylor, Mitchell, Gee, McGregor, 
Winterson, Warner, Jim Crace, and Ali Smith with the fantastic, otherworldly or spectral 
suggests a distinct set of interests and anxieties concerning the return to religious 
language as a way of engaging with questions of futurity and the end of the world that 
have become pervasive throughout British culture in the first decade of the twenty-first 
century. As John A. McClure has observed in his recent study Partial Faiths: 
Postsecular Fiction in the Age of Pynchon and Morrison, what we might call postsecular 
literature “maintains and revises a modernist tradition of spiritually inflected resistance 
to conventionally secular constructions of reality” (143). Similarly, Andrew Tate has 
observed a “return of the miraculous” (1) or “sacred turn” (3) in twenty-first-century 
fiction: “encounters with the uncanny, the unexplained and, occasionally, the divine 
have slipped their generic boundaries and quietly crossed the threshold into the 
predictable world of everyday, mimetic realism” (10).    
 Accompanying this move away from purely secular values and practices is a 
manifest fascination with narrative representations of (post-)apocalypse in twenty-first 
century fiction; in Britain, as elsewhere.4 Our understanding of apocalypse derives from 
the opening Greek word of the Book of Revelation ἀποκάλυψις (translated as 
apocalypse or revelation) whose linguistic similarity to ἀνακάλυψσις, a word that—
during the late first century Common Era when Revelation was written, describes the 
lifting of a veil such as the bride’s veil during a wedding ceremony—has resulted in its 
concomitant etymological meaning of “unveiling” (Huber 159). Interestingly, while 
representations of literary and filmic apocalypse have unquestionably entered the 
mainstream of European and Anglophone culture in recent years, scholarship of the 
origins of apocalypse in Jewish texts of the Hellenistic period, the rediscovered ancient 
Akkadian and Ugaritic literatures, and Greco-Roman and Persian apocalypticism has 
similarly intensified over the last three decades.5  
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The blurring between secular visions of end-of-the-world disaster and narratives 
whose apocalyptic reworking of religious figures and themes signals their postsecular 
interests responds, of course, to the continuation in the twenty-first century of imagining 
environmental collapse. As Terry Gifford argues, the moral sea change in British 
attitudes toward the environment and global warming—as monumental as the change in 
public opinion toward the slave trade two hundred years ago—impacts literary study by 
necessitating an investigation of literature’s bucolic heritage on a global scale. Gifford 
writes that “We [used to be able to] retreat to Arcadia; now Arcadia has its revenge on 
us. . . . The borderland in which we cross-dressed, transgressed, tried out various roles 
and relationships, with external nature and our internal nature, now surrounds us with 
new kinds of borders, demanding new kinds of behaviours, new codes, new 
relationships with both our potentialities, and our pollution” (246). This Arcadian revenge 
has led many writers and commentators to envisage a future in which humanity is wiped 
out: not necessarily by nuclear holocaust as was frequently portrayed in the “Golden 
Age” of science fiction in the 1950s, but by environmental catastrophe and climate 
change. What is remarkable about some of these twenty-first-century fictions, however, 
is their rejection of what Michael Chabon has called the “cold-eyed” “conventional hard-
edged naturalism” of “classic” British science fiction and apocalyptic fiction like M. P. 
Shiel’s The Purple Cloud (1901), John Christopher’s The Death of Grass (1957), and 
John Wyndham’s The Day of the Triffids (1951) (“After the Apocalypse”). Although 
novels like Taylor’s The Island at the End of the World, Gee’s The Flood (2004), 
Winterson’s The Stone Gods (2007), and Crace’s The Pesthouse (2007) represent 
apocalyptic landscapes, the verdant—and even, at times, benevolent—portrayal of 
nature in these novels is a far remove from darkly dystopian depictions of mushroom 
clouds or the post-apocalyptic life of brute survival. Rather, they owe more to the early 
New Wave natural disaster fictions like Ballard’s novels of the 1960s—The Wind From 
Nowhere (1961), The Drowned World (1962), The Burning World (1964), and The 
Crystal World (1966)—than to more recent apocalyptic narratives and such blockbuster 
science fiction disaster movies as Terminator 2: Judgment Day (1991) or Independence 
Day (1996).6  
Returning to our central question of time, apocalyptic representations within 
narrative raise questions of temporal complexity very similar to those we have just 
considered in light of the term metachronous times. As James Berger notes in After the 
End: Representations of Post-Apocalypse, the apocalypse is structurally 
unrepresentable as such and can only be apprehended through the survival of its 
witness-narrator. Surely, as he notes, this suggests the paradox of an end that both 
does and does not take place: “What does this mean, this oxymoron ‘After the end’? 
Before the beginning and after the end, there can only be nothing” (Berger xi). There 
can be no apocalyptic thinking, therefore, without its simultaneous post-apocalyptic 
frame of reference. Moreover, the post-apocalypse in actuality precedes the 
apocalypse, since this is the temporal perspective occupied by the narrators of end-of-
the-world accounts.  
 





Following several recent fictions of the biblical Flood,7 Taylor’s third novel The 
Island at the End of the World opens with a recognizable post-apocalyptic future: cold, 
hard, and sunk beneath an apparently post-nuclear “low dead-ash grey” sky (4). The 
location, we learn, is an island where Ben has lived with his children for seven years 
since a Great Flood. However, Taylor quickly departs from generic post-apocalyptic 
tropes to reveal a self-sufficient paradise of sunflowers and cherry trees, honey, milk 
and wine, centered around the fully-furnished Ark where Ben and his children live with 
their dog, Goldie. “The sky’s permanently blue,” Ben tells us, “the air’s warm and smells 
like heaven, everything we’ve planted is in bloom, the children are happy . . . all’s 
glorious. It’s fucking wonderful” (197). Taylor’s novel is narrated through the 
contrapuntal, oddly mediated and yet seemingly stream-of-consciousness narrative 
voices of Ben and two of his three children: eight-year-old Finn and his teenage sister 
Alice. Ben’s first-person narrative is splintered with a violent Old Testament sense of 
righteousness, his voice slipping between the unctuous supplicant Noah and his 
vengeful patriarch, God; Finn’s contracted, broken language echoes the phonetically 
transliterated dialect of post-apocalyptic Kent in Russell Hoban’s Riddley Walker (1980); 
and Alice’s study of Shakespeare lends her adolescent yearnings a distinctly 
otherworldly, Elizabethan texture.  
Taylor gradually reveals to us that the Great Flood was preceded by a “Year of 
Disasters” (96): a series of religious presages directed at the fallen Babylon (Los 
Angeles), where Ben remembers “the evils that stalked this land before the Great Wave 
crashed down and swallowed them all up” (3). This futuristic, flooded world is connected 
with the present-day reality known to Taylor’s readers through Ben’s memories of his 
“first flood” (17), which submerged the “City of Devils” (New Orleans) in 2005 when Ben 
was five years old. The flood, known in the novel as Hurricane Katrina, is followed by 
another ecological disaster in 2031, a massive earthquake in Los Angeles that prompts 
Ben’s religious conversion and the renunciation of his promising career in advertising: 
“After the quake, I could no longer fake interest in what particular combination of words 
would best help sell sugar-pumped breakfast cereals to borderline obese 6- to 10-year-
olds in the fucking Midwest” (34). We gradually discern from his journal entries that Ben 
understood the earthquake as God’s vengeful response to a fallen and defiled, money-
grabbing world: “and lo the sun became black and the moon became as blood, and . . . 
the senators and the shareholders and copywriters hid themselves in the lobbies of 
skyscrapers, and said to the skyscrapers, Fall on us and hide us from the face of Him 
that sitteth on the throne, for the great day of His wrath is come” (33). Capitalist excess 
(“the wonderful world of money” [32]), Ben concludes, is the target of God’s wrath: the 
Babylonian damnation of avarice, war, and soulless advertising, “all the bullshit pouring 
from the moving mouths on TV, in the Coke and Sprite we drunk and the Nike and Gap 
we wear” (164). After quitting his job, Ben achieves “a sense of freedom, of rightness, 
[he’s] never known before” (34), a religious salvation in which God conveys—through 
the TV pixels and Ben’s baby monitor—that the Earth will be flooded and that Ben has 
been singled out to build an ark and avoid destruction.  
Taylor’s satiric critique of twenty-first-century capitalism through the genre of 
post-apocalypse becomes complicated, however, when it is revealed that Ben has 
constructed his island at the end of the world and that there was no flood in the first 
place. As she reads his stolen journal near the end of the novel, Alice learns about the 
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lengths Ben went to in order to escape from the Babylonian “City of Angels” (16). 
Having discovered the wilderness of giant redwood forests in the Sierra Nevada,8 Ben 
realized that he had found his utopia in the “most gloriously empty valley”: 
 
M[ary] said “What kind of world have we brought our children into?” 
She sobbed. I comforted her, hugged and kissed her, then asked 
how she would feel about moving away from the city. Moving to a place 
where the war would never reach us. A place far away from all the earth’s 
troubles.  
“Oh God, if only we could,” she said.  
“What if I told you we can do exactly that, Mary?” (166). 
 
Ben’s place “far away from all the earth’s troubles” is transformed into an island after a 
winter’s hard labor digging a giant moat around the base of a mountain. However, the 
fledgling island remains anchored to its surroundings, despite Ben’s best efforts to 
construct a hermetically contained retreat, and the encroachment of the outside world 
into his self-sufficient family sphere becomes Ben’s most feared enemy. The novel 
opens with a stranger bobbing on the waveless horizon, threatening to puncture Ben’s 
Eden and deconstruct the myriad of increasingly complex narratives he has fabricated 
to control and contain his children. Throughout the novel, Ben’s violent temper 
escalates—nourished by prolonged bouts of drinking reminiscent of Margaret Atwood’s 
Snowman in Oryx and Crake—as the possibilities that his children will discern the 
cracks in his well-worn narratives of biblical salvation multiply. Ben is plagued by the 
incoming figure of the stranger, who washes up onto their shores and earns the love of 
Ben’s children before Ben has a chance to kill him. The stranger, we learn, is Ben’s own 
nephew, sent from Ben’s wife (Mary, it turns out, didn’t die in the flood but fled the 
island) to rescue Alice, Finn, and Daisy from their volcanically dangerous father. 
Meanwhile, Nature provokes Ben with a drought that reveals the horizon of land beyond 
his enormous moat: “if it doesn’t rain soon,” Ben reflects, “the crops will die, the lake will 
vanish, we will all die of thirst, the horizon will grow wider than the sea . . . and the Day 
of Doom shall be the end of this time” (71). 
For Ben, the island constitutes an alternative temporal modality outside of 
capitalism: “the Promised Land” (70), replete with its own calendric substitute where one 
counts moons instead of years. Ben exists in a perpetual present, haunted by the 
outside world and his own memories of the past, as well as by the spectral future that 
perpetually encroaches into his apparently paradisiacal present and carries with it the 
possibility that his children will discover that they are not alone in a drenched, post-
apocalyptic world. Ben fabulates the past into a disconnected time of nefarious capitalist 
excess, before their “redemption”: “Another world” (96), “a lifetime ago, a world away. . . 
. All gone. In the past. Lost forever” (16). He teaches his children about the “other world” 
(79, 88), or what Finn phonetically calls the “befor world” (77), through popular songs 
adapted to suit his flood-narrative and endless retellings of the story of their salvation. 
Meanwhile, the future is crystallized in the “dark mark” (35, 53, 93) of the stranger (Will) 
threatening to “contaminat[e] our island with traces of Babylon” (35) and poison the 
minds of Ben’s children. The adolescent Alice, however, is desperate to escape their 




remembers and a future she can only dream about. Her language is heavily influenced 
by her reading of Shakespeare,9 whose plays offer her “another time, before the before” 
(129); that is, a glimpse into the blasphemous Babylonian “before” of an irreligious 
capitalism that preceded their biblical rescue from drowning. She longs to ask Will about 
the people and places that exist outside the parameters of their closed world, “about 
before, about beyond” (146), but is paralyzed by the power of her own hopes and fears. 
Alice struggles to remember this pre-island world, but believes that “there is 
something real there, something uneroded by time” (125). Her hope is spurred on by 
Ben’s refusal to explain the mysteries of their isolated existence; mysteries he 
unwittingly engenders by telling her there is a “Knowing Tree” in the out-of-bounds giant 
sequoia “Afterwoods”:  
 
Finally one night I was so tired so sorry for her I gave her what I thought 
was a crumb of hope. I said You’re not old enough to know the whole truth 
but, and told her about the Tree of Knowledge. A mistake. THE mistake. 
Fatal I should never have mentioned it. Because that crumb was not a 
crumb it was a seed, and it’s been growing ever since, growing roots and 
leaves, stronger and longer and now has flowered. (54) 
 
Taylor’s phonetic pun Afterwoods/afterwards thus consciously reaffirms the threat that 
the future plays—in Finn’s words, “[t]owring over us like all ways” (9)—in undermining 
Ben’s engineered Arcadia. Ben’s Tree of Knowledge becomes the focal point around 
which Alice’s projected hopes and fears about the outside world crystallize. Her hope, 
however, is “almost more unbearable than [her] fear” (125). Although the prospect of 
knowledge pertaining to the outside world fuels Alice’s hopes that her mother might still 
be alive somewhere, it also contains the fear that Mary is really dead and that they are 
actually alone in the world: “It’s the not knowing, I suppose: the event on the horizon, 
still invisible, at least to me. . . . Hope, Hope, and, like a shadow issuing blackly from its 
heels, fear” (174-5). Similarly, in Taylor’s second novel, The Amnesiac, hope and fear 
are depicted as structural inversions of the same anticipatory emotion. “What is fear,” 
asks James, “but hope in the dark? What is hope but fear bathed in light?” (Amnesiac 
149). Although they carry within them the utopian anticipation of something beyond the 
present world, for James hope is “the more dangerous and unbearable variation” of fear 
(243), and he calls hope “that sly, insinuating monster” (274).  
Taylor, then, reminds us of the dangers of utopian social engineering, even at the 
scale of the individual family. In this sense, The Island retells both the story of utopian 
beginnings set out in Taylor’s first novel The Republic of Trees and the central 
investigation of what Taylor has called “the horror of hope” in his second novel The 
Amnesiac (“Interview”). This slippery dialectic in Taylor’s novels between utopian hope 
and dystopian fear is integrally bound up with questions of temporality. In The Island, 
both the future—explicitly connected with the forest of Afterwoods—and the past 
exceed Ben’s tyrannical control. The past forms a vast and threatening iceberg of 
memory submerged beneath his consciousness, what James refers to in The Amnesiac 
as “the noisy, brutal chaos underneath. The past” (114). However, even Ben in his more 
sober moments admits that it is impossible to bury the past entirely and—after the 
shock of realizing he has a heart condition—decides to keep a journal in order to record 
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the truth about the island in the event of his death: “I had always believed myself 
invulnerable, immortal, here in this Eden. But . . . after that day, I knew I had to leave 
them some clue to their past, to the nature of the world beyond this island. Just in case” 
(30-1). Interestingly, the temporality that characterizes Ben’s personal “Eden” of 
delusional escapism is shared by James in The Amnesiac, whose “time of absolute 
optimism” (45) depends on complete dissociation from either the past or the future: “I 
thought about the present and felt happy. I thought about the future and my mind was 
as blank and light as the walls that I painted. I never, ever thought about the past” (45-
6). The present tense, for Ben, constitutes “tangible reality” (Island 57), correlated 
through the undeniably material contours of the island with its harsh winters and balmy 
summer nights. Like Milton’s Satan in Paradise Lost, Ben can only rely on the visual 
materials around him to coordinate his sense of temporal reality, having submerged the 
past—along with what he knows to be true about the world—beneath a narrative of 
biblical apocalypse and redemption: “Often, I find, it is better to forget what you KNOW, 
and to believe only what you can SEE with your own two eyes” (Island 36).  
Alice’s attempts to glean knowledge of the outside world and of a time beyond 
Ben’s amnesiac present positions her as struggling toward a utopian temporal 
connection between past, present and future. Her freedom is contingent on networking 
the static time of the island both with the family’s true past (“before”) and her own 
imagined future (“beyond”). Alice, therefore, can only construct an independent future 
for herself beyond the violent dictates of her father’s regressive “island” utopia through 
smashing his despotic, “pure” present. In this sense, the knowledge she gains of the 
outside world in the novel’s climax—perched precariously atop the Knowing Tree’s 
viewing platform—not only opens up a possible future for her beyond the island, but 
also restores her childhood past—the memories she is sure she has but that Ben has 
consistently brainwashed her into not believing: “I feel as if something precious has 
been stolen from my life. And I can’t even remember what it is” (125). Ben’s control over 
his children thus depends on his control of time and of their understanding of their own 
pasts. As Michael realizes in The Republic of Trees, any successful republic or utopian 
community requires not only an alternative mode of time but, crucially, authority over 
how it represents its past to its members: “The important thing about history is that there 
is only one version. All competing versions must be erased, deleted, rewritten. There is 
no space in history for regrets or alternatives. History is a line—it is a single path. If the 
path forks, then only one of the forking paths can be history. The other path is nothing. It 
leads nowhere” (134-5). Ben’s attempt to engineer Eden, his rewriting of his family’s 
history and their seemingly cataphatic delivery from a watery apocalypse, is 
foreshadowed in The Amnesiac by James’ alter ego John, who desires to “defy the laws 
of physics and metaphysics and actually turn back time” (371-2). Having orchestrated 
the suicide of his rival, John determines to enter his personal, lovers’ utopia with 
Angelina by turning back the clock to live out an alternative future: “Now [Ivan] was 
slain, there was no reason why the two of us could not recreate Eden” (372). James’ 
attempt to “recreate Eden” with his former lover reveals not only the static nature of any 
imposed, authoritarian utopia but also the temporal stagnation that accompanies 
totalitarian closure. He longs to live in a “temporal vacuum,”  what he also refers to as 
“that timeless Paradise that all lovers inhabit” (312), and what Michael defines in The 





The dystopian nightmare of Ben’s island thus emerges out of his similar attempts 
to engineer utopia and arrest time; that is, to literally arrest his children’s psychological 
and intellectual development through a complete divorce from “that other world” (79), 
“The world we left behind. The world that got drowned by the flood” (88). This arrest of 
time not only forecloses any futural time of alternative possibility but also actuates a 
total negation of the past. As Winston tries to explain to Julia in George Orwell’s 
Nineteen Eighty-Four,, IngSoc’s totalitarian control of time extends to the eradication of 
historical alternatives so that—in Benjamin’s words—“even the dead will not be safe 
from the enemy if he wins” (255): “History has stopped. Nothing exists except an 
endless present, in which the Party is always right” (Orwell 162).  
 
Natural Historical Time  
 
Taylor’s characters in The Island at the End of the World are thus trapped in the 
Orwellian “endless present” of a historyless, engineered utopia. Meanwhile, Taylor’s 
portrayal of the omniscient sequoia landscape—crystallized in the image of the 
magnificent “Knowing Tree”—reveals significant implications for a correspondence 
between nature and temporality, particularly when read comparatively alongside the 
representations of natural environments (notably forests) in The Republic of Trees and 
The Amnesiac. Throughout The Island, the omnipotence of the natural world is 
overcoded with pathetic fallacy. Will—synonymous with the temporal rupture of the 
outside world as it finally penetrates Ben’s “pure” present—arrives during a “tempest” 
(126) and is accompanied by an end to the painful drought and a harmonious time of 
plenty for the family. Meanwhile, the characters turn to nature to glean the religious 
significance of their situation. Finn, for instance, stares at the mercurial sky as he 
grieves for his cat, observing in his phonetic English that the sky is “like the face of God 
up there. Blank an spression less an terrible bright” (63). Similarly, Ben confronts the 
sky for meaning: “I stare into the pitiless blue. I stare into the face of God” (114). Finally, 
nature exceeds Ben’s control and Alice—led on by Will, who has become her lover—
commits the ultimate act of filial disobedience, ascending the “sacred and forbidden” 
(201) Knowing Tree to discover the horizon of the outside world: “I stand up, and walk to 
the edge. What I see changes everything. My whole life. The whole world. The sea is 
not a sea. The island is not an island. I shudder, reeling back from the shock – and the 
glory” (205). Watching them on the platform, Ben realizes that Alice can no longer be 
controlled and, through her adolescent development into a postlapsarian state of 
knowing adulthood, “is become as one of us” (201). After the novel’s climax, we learn 
that Alice and Will are no longer on the island, but it remains unclear whether Ben has 
killed them or whether they successfully escaped the viewing platform of the Knowing 
Tree. Ben blames his Knowing Tree for being his enemy in facilitating Alice’s final 
moment of freedom (knowledge), calling it “this brazen traitor” (209). Brandishing a 
chainsaw, he starts to sabotage the enormous roots of the tree in an attempt to prevent 
his remaining two children, Finn and Daisy, from ever discovering this secret knowledge 
of the outside world: “No more will you lead them on, no more will you steal my children, 
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O Tree of Knowledge. […] I must nip the devil in the bud I must cut him off at the roots I 
must saw his fucking soul in two to save my innocents” (210). As he saws maniacally, 
the wood-dust from the tree’s roots afflict Ben like the past he has tried desperately to 
erase: “[d]ust, clouds of dust, everywhere, blinding my eyes, filling my mouth, sticking to 
my skin, like the Past” (210). The tree’s felling signifies the inauguration of a new, even 
more tyrannical phase of Ben’s utopian program, in which time really will stand still and 
“there shall be no more death, neither sorrow, nor crying” (210). Despite the violence of 
Ben’s sabotage and his castigation of the tree—whose branches he describes as “like 
the sinners of Babylon vainly waiting and praying to be let into Paradise” (190)—this 
outburst serves only to reinforce the agency of the natural world. Although Ben declares 
that there shall be no more sorrow or crying, the novel ends with his drunken, infantile 
weeping, comforted by the toddler Daisy who, as Finn observes, tells him Grimm-like 
fairytales of “ haply [e]verafter” (215). Nature, of course, cannot be controlled by Ben 
even on such a small scale as his island.  
Ben’s utopian/dystopian exit from the world through the construction of his 
“island” is thus a failed retreat into nature that, as Jacob Taubes writes in The Political 
Theology of Paul, “is a very important category—an eschatological category” (73). It is 
here that the eschatological implications of what we might call Ben’s pseudo-
apocalypse become fully apparent, and we realize that Taylor is enacting a structural 
reversal of the usual categories of apocalyptic time. Apocalyptic representation, as I 
mentioned earlier, presents us with a temporal paradox since its narration of the end of 
time raises the contradiction that a temporal event that is exterior to time can only be 
narrated within a temporal framework. Moreover, the narrative theme of apocalypse 
brings together disjunctive temporal spheres beyond the problem of representation and 
the unavoidable framework of “after the end.” Indeed, the judgment of last things—
eschatology—introduces into the narrative present both a consideration of all past 
events and actions, as well as those that remain to come. Reconsidering Jewish 
messianism, Giorgio Agamben refers to this time still to come not as “the end of time,” 
but as “the time that remains between time and its end” (62). Within apocalyptic 
narratives, then, there exists a time ambiguously located between chronological time—
“the realm of devouring Chronos” (Principle 1181)—and the totalizing, futural 
apocalyptic eschaton. The concern with the end of historical time that the genre of 
apocalypse raises thus forces us to confront what Steven Connor calls “the persistence 
and proximity of the not yet [that] introduces the end of history into history itself, turning 
it into an always already” (203).  
This proximity of the “not yet” punctures our understanding of chronological time 
and necessitates a more differentiated temporal framework. Interestingly, although 
Connor does not demonstrate any awareness of this, the philosophical formulation of 
the “not yet” was developed by Ernst Bloch, whose concept of “non-contemporaneity” 
(Ungleichzeitigkeit) I cited earlier. Coined in 1907, and developed throughout his long 
career until his death in 1977, the not yet (Noch Nicht) was the central, organizing motif 
within Bloch’s vast and extraordinarily wide-ranging philosophical oeuvre, which he 
used to consider both the utopian surplus from previous cultural forms residual within 
the present, as well as the futural “anticipatory consciousness” (Vorschein) of emergent, 
radically other ways of being already at work in the present (Waibl and Herdina 18). For 




and almost entirely ignored writings on natural historical times raise some very 
significant questions concerning both the metachronous representation of time in 
contemporary British novels such as The Island at the End of the World, as well as the 
theorization of time within current post-apocalyptic, ecocritical, and utopian frameworks 
for literary analysis. 
Bloch considers this anthropocentric division of historical time in Atheism in Christianity, 
where he argues that despite the Church’s appropriation of various pagan myths—
including Stoicism and Gnosticism’s engagements with the nature-religions of the 
Egyptian and Babylonian states, and the pagan origins of Christmas and Easter—
Nature is largely feared and demonized in the Bible. However, these myths deconstruct 
any logos-centered understanding of human history, progress, and teleology and furnish 
“deep-reaching memories which still enable nature to be seen not just as a cold 
shoulder, or a source of terror, or a mere receptacle for the past” (Atheism 191). Bloch’s 
interrogation of Nature in terms of eschatological time and messianic justice introduces 
one of his most radical critiques of both Judeo-Christian theology and dialectical 
materialism: the positing of natural historical time. In The Philosophy of the Future, 
Bloch poses the problem of the “pure past” of Nature, whose potentialities have been 
muzzled by manifold philosophical categories of historical time; from Herder and Ranke 
through to Hegel. In such formulations, Nature is identified as “pre-historical” (134), a 
static raw material “virtually inert to process” (134), whose time is qualitatively different 
from the more “dense” (134) category of historical time. Consequently, as Bloch writes, 
“the formally so much longer duration of natural time, because it extends before human 
history, is longer only according to the mode of the past, but not according to the mode 
of the future which, as generally supposed, is wholly predominant in human history” 
(133-4).The “pure past” of Nature—along with other supposed pure pasts including, in 
Hegel’s formulation, the non-industrialized civilizations of early nineteenth-century India 
and China—reveals the absurdity of the application of “rigid-Euclidean” (135) 
formulations of space in constructing linear understandings of progress as a 
“homogeneous succession of events in time” (132). “Wouldn’t it be really absurd,” Bloch 
asks, to maintain that “the vast moving universe and its motion, wholly unmediated with 
us in the multitude of its stars, has its ‘continuation’ pure and simple in the existing 
history of mankind, and has achieved its substantial goal in existing cultures? So that . . 
. the time of the previous history of Nature would appear empty, and—in contrast to the 
time of human history—without any noteworthy future mode of its own? (136). Bloch 
sees such notions of historical time as falsely dichotomizing the freedom of 
technological progress with the “pre-history” of Nature—understood as a terminated 
cycle whose lumbering after-effects serve only to reveal its entropic lassitude. In 
contradistinction to this “empty, futureless natural time” (137), Bloch proposes an 
alternative time of Nature; what he calls the anticipatory, “tomorrow of Nature” (137) 
replete with the futurity of natural diachronic processes.  
Returning to our consideration of Taylor’s The Island at the End of the World, 
Bloch’s reflections on a non- (or post-)anthropomorphic conceptualization of historical 
time allow us to interrogate the temporal implications of Ben’s engineered apocalypse. 
Read through a Blochian lens, we can identify that Taylor reverses the relegation of 
nature to pre-history: it is not pre-industrial nature that is trapped within the “pure past” 
of pre-history, but humanity (personified in the figure of Ben) that occupies a history-less 
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pure present. Ben, not Nature, suffers in an empty, futureless time, while the Sequoia 
forest (and the Knowing Tree in particular) bears witness to the repressed geographical 
and historical truth of the family’s situation, becoming the site of ultimate temporal 
knowledge: the only location on the entire island whose altitudinous viewing platform 
offers a panorama of the outside world with its temporal connections of the past that 
Ben left behind as well as the future he refuses to acknowledge—connections Ben 
simultaneously wishes to retain (as evidenced by his decision to build the platform), yet 
that he denies his children in an effort to arrest their development and shield them from 
knowledge and its perceived biblical sinfulness. Like the apocalyptic event itself, the 
natural time signified by the Knowing Tree resists categorization or narrative coherence 
since, as Theodor Adorno has argued, “The dignity of nature is that of the not-yet-
existing; by its expression it repels intentional humanization” (83). Paradoxically, 
however, this not-yet-existing of natural futurity requires our attempts to render it in 
anthropomorphic narrative terms, precisely in order to retain its unthinkability. Taylor’s 
narrative representations of natural historical time might therefore be usefully 
considered in terms of the question of eschatology, or final judgment. In Theology of 
Hope, Jürgen Moltmann asks, “Can a distinction be made between historic 
eschatologies and cosmic eschatologies, between eschatologies within history and 
transcendental eschatologies? Does the Eschaton mean merely ‘future’, or is it applied 
to the absolute future as opposed to history?” (125). Moltmann’s suggestion that 
eschatology refers not only to human history but, more broadly, to the history of the 
cosmos—and his differentiation between an absolute (messianic) futurity as opposed to 
a historical futurity—suggests a differentiation between the non-contemporaneous times 
experienced by man and those suggested in the natural environment.  
This differentiation is strikingly articulated in The Republic of Trees. As Michael’s 
republic enters its own Robespierrean revolutionary terror and the group starts 
executing its least obedient members, Michael returns to the trees—his former comfort 
zone—and realizes that the world “had not ended; nature was enduring, unconcerned” 
(206). The post-apocalyptic endurance of “unconcerned” nature offers Michael an 
escape from the brutally out-of-control, amnesiac present in which he presides over the 
remaining members of the republic on account of his callous detachment, and he rejects 
the past (memory) as well as the future (dream, conscience) in favour of an animalistic 
celebration of what Bloch calls “the darkness of the here and now” (Principle 187); 
whose temporal proximity to the subject renders it mysterious, unfathomable, and 
unthinkable : 
 
The horizon was clear and I could see the whole, vast span of the 
Pyrenees. Snowless, in the summer light, the mountains looked flat, 
almost like film-studio cut-outs, yet there was a living gleam to their brown 
flanks that made me think of cows or horses. They seemed to breathe and 
pulse, even as they loomed there, dwarfing us all. Ideas and words, 
republics and gods, all withered in their shadows. . . . In the euphoria of 
the moment, I lost my balance. The forest swam below my feet. I felt 
blazingly, precariously alive. (220-3) 
 




death. Similarly, one of James’ several alter egos in The Amnesiac goes into the forest 
to die alone, an act that echoes the “near-ecstatic ‘abandonment to nature’” he had 
developed in his philosophical volume, The Light (246). Ryal’s enlightening, near-
ecstatic “abandonment to nature,” as well as Michael’s feeling in the forest of being 
“blazingly, precariously alive,” suggest that nature gives Taylor’s characters their 
humanity, paradoxically at the moments when they are revealed as being at their least 
human and most barbaric. Although Ben reaches toward this natural eschatological 
experience, his powerful commitment to remaining within a pure present prevents him 
from achieving Ryal’s “abandonment to nature.” Meanwhile, James discovers in The 
Amnesiac that the only way to resolve this temporal dilemma is to occupy a mode of 
pure presentness through the oblivion of forgetting and the simple escapist desire to live 
in the now: “The only way to live in the present is to forget trying to grasp it, to float in its 
current, not to think at all” (140).  
James’ dilemma of being “always marooned in the present” (379) foreshadows 
Ben’s solution to the problem of controlling time—and nature—in The Island. As David 
Wood has argued, “If we think of time as a series of discrete presents, or simply ‘live in 
the present,’ relational complexity is dead” (213). It is this “relational complexity” of 
time—what Wood elsewhere refers to as the “deep temporal complexity” uncovered by 
an attention to ecocritical impulses in fiction11—that Ben is unable to achieve. While he 
attempts to escape the besmirched world of capital through a retreat into nature, Ben’s 
exercise in American pastoralism fails to strike the correct balance between nature and 
civilization.12 Unlike Prospero’s magically conjured, chimerical island, Ben’s construction 
of a bucolic enclave offers neither a “landscape of reconciliation” (Marx 72) nor 
improves his relations with his children, and Taylor’s biting satire instead utilizes the 
biblical narratives of Genesis, Eden, and the serpent—with its twin sins of awakening 
through knowledge and carnality—to offer a dystopian projection of Noah’s inebriated 
patriarchal tyranny. If we read The Island at the End of the World in conjunction with 
Taylor’s first two thematically-interlaced novels, The Republic of Trees and The 
Amnesiac, we can identify that The Island continues Taylor’s aesthetic preoccupation 
with presenting nature as living and pulsing—magnificently dominating the dwarfish 
attempts of mankind to create order, meaning or control. As such, these novels reveal 
that Taylor’s characters understand Nature’s almost-religious occupation of an infinite 
time that surpasses anthropocentric temporality and endures beyond humanity’s 
apocalyptic ruptures.  
 Bloch’s overlooked model of natural historical time thus has particular 
significance for my analysis of Taylor. Firstly, his explicitly eschatological model 
considers Nature beyond the reductive dichotomy (beloved of the pastoral tradition) of 
the Arcadian retreat or utopian garden paradise and its antithesis of the savage 
wilderness or apocalyptic ecocatastrophe. Here, Nature—in an explicitly Marxist 
sense—refers not to the domestication of the landscape in order to yield resources 
essential to industrial productivity, but more importantly to (wo)man’s own nature; 
alienated from itself, its social communities and its non-human surroundings by the 
exploitative processes of the capitalist extraction of surplus value. Meanwhile, Bloch’s 
sketch of the temporalities of Nature might help us to orient ecocriticism in the direction 
of a return to the primacy of praxis without committing either the “referential fallacy”—
declaring “there is no such thing as nature” because it is a linguistic concept of our own 
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making—or the “semiotic fallacy”—declaring that nature can only be signified within 
human culture (Coupe 2). This concern with a progressive politicization of the non- or 
post-human environment helps, perhaps, address the problems that have faced the 
genre of pastoral in recent years as David James and Philip Tew have observed: 
“Arcadian or bucolic traditions are either misunderstood or misrepresented as simply a 
contraction into conservative nostalgia” (13).  
 Given that apocalyptic and post-apocalyptic representations, as Berger notes, 
offer “a total critique of any existing social order” (7), it is interesting to consider the 
reasons for Taylor choosing to set his narrative of patriarchal tyranny in present-day 
America. The US has an inherent relationship with apocalypse in terms of the 
representation of its New World possibilities as either paradisal or hellish, the protracted 
slaughter of indigenous inhabitants by European settlers, its constitutional break from 
Europe, and the subcontinent’s continuing struggle with natural disasters.13 Similarly, 
Jim Crace’s The Pesthouse (2007) imagines a distant post-apocalyptic American future 
that, although ravaged by an inscrutable natural disaster, offers a distinctly utopian, 
pastoral representation the survival of the (adoptive) nuclear family as an abiding logic 
of community.14 British novels such as Taylor’s The Island at the End of the World and 
Crace’s The Pesthouse can thus be identified as exploring a concept of nature that 
fundamentally critiques what John Urry has called modernity’s understanding of the 
natural world as a “realm of unfreedom and hostility” (9-10). 
Frank Kermode famously referred to the apocalyptic imaginary as “our deep 
need for intelligible Ends” (8), which projects us “past the End, so as to see the structure 
whole, a thing we cannot do from our spot of time in the middle” (8). This statement 
neatly encapsulates the temporal complexity of the ways in which writers respond 
through their use of narrative to the question, as Connor notes, “of how we are to live in 
and out of history” (204). Nature, perhaps, offers one narrative strategy for imagining a 
temporality whose non-contemporaneous impulses can help us orient ourselves within a 
world that far exceeds our own control, enabling us to trace the bucolic heritage in 
literature without lapsing into what Bloch pejoratively called the uncritical pastoralism of 
“pure Pan” (212). The literary genres of post-apocalypticism and of pastoral are, then, 
foregrounded in the twenty-first century both in terms of current planetary ecoscarcities 
and imagined apocalyptic catastrophes; as well as in light of increasingly postsecular 
attempts to frame narrative time through questions of final judgment and non-, post-
human and/or deus ex machina agencies. As Dominic Head has recently asserted, the 
novel continues in the twenty-first century to offer us unique temporal perspectives:  
the structure of the novel is one that demonstrates the horizontality of 
time, and can deliver the complete temporal consciousness that is 
sometimes felt to be missing in everyday life, governed by short-term 
goals and ephemeral cultural forms […] through its fluid yet cohesive use 
of time, the novel fashions a mode of temporal understanding that is 
unavailable in other forms of writing, and that assists our comprehension 
of the individual’s ongoing role in social history. (2) 
 
In this sense, Taylor’s first three novels explore metachronous narrative times as a way 
of satirically critiquing the linearity of ceaseless capitalist expansion, but also in order to 




Taylor’s novels suggests that rather than shooting at the clocks, we need to consider an 
alternative understanding of temporality in which industrial modernity’s implacable 






1 As Koselleck observes: “in the German, Zeit only appears as a formal determination of generality in the 
2 Taylor has acknowledged these influences. See Somerset’s review of The Republic of Trees.   
3 For a useful discussion of Bloch’s development of a processual metaphysics and the philosophy of the 
“Not-Yet-Conscious,” see Hudson (88-96). 
4 Critics who have commented on the vogue for contemporary “literary” novelists to utilize science fiction 
generic elements include Matt Thorne, Kai Maristed, Michael Chabon and Ursula K Le Guin, who writes 
that “Formerly deep-dyed realists are producing novels so full of the tropes and fixtures and plotlines of 
science fiction that only the snarling tricephalic dogs who guard the Canon of Literature can tell the 
difference.” The utilization of science fiction tropes within late twentieth- and early twenty-first-century 
literary fiction continues across Europe and North America. See: John Updike’s Toward the End of Time 
(1997), Cormac McCarthy’s The Road (2007), David Maine’s The Flood (2009), Margaret Atwood’s Oryx 
and Crake (2003) and The Year of the Flood (2009); and in French and German fiction, catastrophe 
bestsellers including Franz Schätzing’s The Swarm (2004) and Michel Houellebecq’s The Possibility of an 
Island (2005). 
5 Collins and McGinn observe that “[o]ver the past thirty years, more scholarship has been devoted to 
apocalypticism than in the previous three hundred” (p. ix). 
6 For a discussion of the move to the mainstream of apocalyptic narratives in the 1990s, see Luckhurst 
231. 
7 For other recent fictions of post-apocalyptic and biblical floods, see Will Self, The Book of Dave (2006); 
David Maine, The Flood (2004); and Margaret Atwood, The Year of the Flood (2009). 
8 The fictional detective, Martin Thwaite, recollects admiring “the ancient Redwood trees in Sequoia” in 
The Amnesiac (307). Given the dense interlacing of themes in Taylor’s novels and the geographical detail 
we are supplied with concerning the location of Ben’s “island,” we can speculate fairly accurately that it is 
Ash Mountain in Sequoia National Park, California. Interestingly, the largest Giant Sequoia tree in the 
park, General Sherman, not only fits the profile of Ben’s “Knowing Tree” in The Island at the End of the 
World, but has its own utopian history: it was renamed the “Karl Marx tree” by the inhabitants of Kahweah 
Colony, a utopian Socialist community that existed in Sequoia National Park between 1886 and 1892. 
See Boal et. al. (4).  
9 The children are only allowed to read three books on the island—the Bible, the complete works of 
Shakespeare and Grimm’s fairytales (45). 
10 Christoph Wulf similarly notes that “Adam and Eve’s life in Paradise was outside time” (51). 
11 According to David Wood, the “plexity of time” or “time’s deep temporal complexity” is composed of 
four strands: (1) the invisibility of time; (2) the celebration of finitude; (3) the coordination of rhythms; and 
(4) the interruption and breakdown of temporal horizons (213). 
12 Leo Marx considers Shakespeare’s utilization of the Elizabethan tradition of pastoral/bucolic garden 
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retreats in The Machine in the Garden, arguing that The Tempest is “a prologue to American literature” 
(72). 
13 For a concise summary of America’s relationship with apocalypse, see Berger (133-4). 
14 For a fuller discussion of Crace’s utilization of the genre of post-apocalypse in The Pesthouse, see 
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